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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Within the last couple of years, Russia has been experiencing a budget
surplus due to high oil prices worldwide; however, the existing system of
budget revenues still remains inefficient. One of the possible ways to in-
crease its efficiency is to raise the share of natural resource rental pay-
ments in budget revenues. Although Russia is very rich in natural re-
sources, this share remains extremely low — less than 4% of the
consolidated budget. It should be kept in mind that a considerable share
of budget revenues is collected in natural resource sectors through other
(non-rental) payments — VAT, profit tax, etc. It should be stressed that
natural resource rent is one of the most efficient sources of budget
revenues, since, unlike traditional taxes, it does not introduce distortions
in the use of production factors. Increasing the share of rental payments
appropriated by the state will stimulate economic development of both
regions and the country as a whole.
Relative to rental payments, the Russian timber sector is similar to other
natural resource sectors. The state, being the sole owner of forests in
Russia, imposes the minimum value of stumpage fees at the federal
level, which can be somewhat increased by local authorities. The existing
system of setting stumpage fees has been inherited from the Soviet
times and does not conform to market conditions. The average value of
stumpage fees is very low: in 2000 it equaled RUB18 per cubic meter
(less than US$ 1). For comparison, in neighboring Finland the corre-
sponding figure is US$ 25 per cubic meter, and in Estonia, a country
with an economy in transition, — US$ 15 per cubic meter. As a result,
the share of stumpage fees in regional budgets is very low; for example,
in the relatively forest-rich Novgorod Oblast, it was just over 1% in 1999.
The low level of stumpage fees leads to inadequate budget financing of
leskhozy (forest management agencies), whose main task is to ensure the
efficiency of forestry. This forces leskhozy to engage in commercial activi-
ties, to the detriment of the long-term interests of the forestry sector.
Up to now, estimation of natural resource rent (including timber rent) in
Russia was not paid proper attention by either state authorities or
economists. There are relatively few papers on this subject; those that
do exist are based on highly aggregate data and are, to a considerable
extent, of a hypothetical character and not supported by empirical re-
search. In this paper, timber rent in Russia has been estimated and the
possibilities of shifting the tax burden to rental payments have been
analyzed. The traditional Western approach to defining stumpage fees,
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based on netting all costs (including "normal" profit) out of the timber
market price, is hardly applicable for Russia. The main reason for this is
the extremely low quality of data on logging. For example, according to
the data from logging enterprises in the Komi Republic, all enterprises
were loss making in 1997.
Using the data on normative logging costs and on timber auctions in the
Novgorod Oblast, timber rent, depending on the tree type, timber quality
and hauling distance, has been estimated. Based on these estimates,
actual logging costs and timber prices, received by loggers, have been
obtained.
The estimated costs proved to be substantially lower than those reported
by loggers. At the same time, estimated prices, at which loggers sell
their timber, are also lower than the market price. One possible explana-
tion of this can be the existence of a monopsony, when a relatively few
intermediaries buy timber from many loggers who do not have, as a rule,
their own marketing services. Thus, the significant share of timber rent is
captured by intermediaries.
The research has shown that raising stumpage fees up to the level that
corresponds to timber rent is quite realistic and will increase the effi-
ciency of forestry. As stated above, increasing the share of natural re-
source rent in federal and regional budgets can be economically benefi-
cial. To support this statement, the effect of shifting the tax burden from
labor to timber rent in the Novgorod Oblast has been evaluated, under
the assumption that total budget revenues were kept constant. The re-
sults indicate that doubling the share of timber rent appropriated by the
state could increase employment by nearly 1% and regional output
by 0.35%.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last couple of years, Russia has been experiencing a budget sur-
plus due to high oil prices worldwide. However, the existing system of
budget revenues still remains inefficient. One possible way to increase its
efficiency is to raise the share of natural resource rental payments in
budget revenues. Although Russia is very rich in natural resources, this
share remains extremely low — less than 4% of the consolidated budget.
Admittedly, a considerable share of budget revenues is collected in
natural resource sectors through other (non-rental) payments — VAT,
profit tax, etc. It should be stressed that natural resource rent is one of
the most efficient sources of budget revenues since, unlike traditional
taxes, rental payments do not introduce distortions in the use of produc-
tion factors. Increasing the share of rental payments appropriated by the
state will stimulate economic development of both regions and the
country as a whole.
As regards rental payments, the Russian timber sector is similar to other
natural resource sectors. In Russia, the state, being the sole owner of
forests, has to ensure efficient forest management, which is character-
ized by two particular problems. First, forests are a renewable natural re-
source, which means that the owner should solve the corresponding in-
ter-temporal problem of forest exploitation. This problem boils down
to choosing the best rotation, i.e., the optimal age at which a timber
stand is to be cut. A vast portion of the literature on forest economics is
devoted to inter-temporal problems and specifically to the rotation prob-
lem — finding the optimal time to cut an even-aged forest (see, for ex-
ample, Johanson and Löfgren, 1985; Montgomery and Adams, 1995).
The optimal harvesting time is determined, to a considerable extent, by
the market interest rate, which in Russia is very high and highly volatile.
For instance, the current real interest rate is about 10 percent (the
nominal interest rate is about 30 percent at the current inflation rate of
about 20 percent). The probability that the real interest rate will drop
down to supportable and stable levels within the coming years is very
low. It is therefore difficult to use the real interest rate to rationally
choose the optimal harvesting time.
In Russia, sophisticated methods for choosing the optimal time to cut an
even-aged forest are hardly applicable; thus, the state selects the timber
stands that should be exploited by using simple practical methods.
The optimal rotation issue is not within the scope of this paper. Here, we
take the rotation scheme as given and examine the second problem in
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the area of forest management, namely how to set the price (stumpage
fee) at which a particular timber stand should be leased to private log-
ging companies.
To determine stumpage fees, developed countries have now widely
adopted stumpage appraisal, whereby the stumpage value is calculated
as the difference between the market price for round wood (sometimes
also sawn goods or processed wood) and production costs, allowing for
a normal (i.e., competitive) profit rate. This procedure is complex and
costly, and presupposes the existence of a reliable accounting system.
For example, the United States Forest Service handbook on stumpage
appraisal in the Pacific Northwest contains over 300 pages. Such a sys-
tem is hardly suitable for Russia, where the revenue system ought to be
as simple as possible. In this regard, the experience of some developing
countries with respect to timber taxation can prove useful. For example,
in the appraisal system developed for the Australian state of Tasmania
and used in several developing countries, allowances for six cost factors
are deducted to arrive at the royalty for the particular timber involved.
These factors are: (1) total timber volume available (5 classes); (2) ac-
cess to market, defined as the distance to a port (3 classes); (3) climate
(3 classes); (4) stand quality (3 classes); (5) log haulage distance to
conversion plant or log export point (5 classes); and (6) topography and
soil (3 classes). It should be mentioned that the resulting normative rent
(stumpage value) could then also be used as the initial price in auctions
(Gray, 1983).
In Russia, the few existing papers on the valuation of natural resource
rents, including timber rent, are of a hypothetical character, are not
based on econometric estimation, and deal mostly with the problem on a
highly aggregated level (see, e.g., Golub et al., 1999; Fomenko et al.,
1997; Lvov, 1994; Markandya and Averchenkova, 2000; Sheingauz,
1997; Pankratova, 1999; Pochinkov, 2000).
Like other natural resources, timber is under-priced in Russia. The sys-
tem of stumpage fees was established under Czar Paul I. Over time, the
system was refined to become a sophisticated scheme whereby stump-
age value would reflect market prices for wood products and the rent-
generating factors specific to each harvested plot of forest land. With the
advent of communist thought, market relations were obliterated. In the
forest sector, this implied a complete overhaul of the stumpage fee sys-
tem. In keeping with the Marxist labor theory of value, in 1949 Soviet
economists made stumpage fees a function of the labor costs of forest
regeneration, disregarding the economic and geographic rent-generating
factors of forest exploitation (Letyagin and Pochinkov, 1998; Markandya
et al., 1999; Pitovranov, 2000). The correlation between stumpage fees
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and rent was thus severed: stumpage fees were set independent of the
excess profit earned due to natural conditions and fluctuations in the
market price for timber. They became very similar across the Soviet Un-
ion, as labor costs themselves were homogeneous.
Subsequently, fees were slightly differentiated to account for the fol-
lowing five variables: (1) the region in which felling takes place (leso-
taksovy rayon); (2) the tree species composing the stand to be felled;
(3) the distance between the stand and the nearest road or railroad;
(4) the usage of the timber to be felled (commercial or firewood); and
(5) the width of the tree stem for merchantable wood (wide, medium or
thin). Although these variables reflect differences in the inherent value
of timber, the system fails to reflect the absolute rent, as the stumpage
fee is set regardless of the market price of timber or its by-products.
The system does not conceive of stumpage fee as residual value.
These fees were included in price lists (preiskurant). Today's forest
revenue system is the result of the 1949 abolishment of the links be-
tween forest prices and the market, with relatively minor corrections
made to the Soviet price lists. As a result, minimum stumpage fees are
set artificially low. With fees so low, no incentive exists for more ra-
tional resource use, and the timber rent escapes capture (Letyagin and
Pochinkov, 1998; Pitovranov, 2000).
Today timber user fees are set at the federal level. Article 103 of the
1997 Forest Code of the Russian Federation provides that "payments for
use by the Forest Fund are collected in the form of forest taxes (lesnye
podati) or rental charges (arendnaya plata)" (GOR, 1997). Forest taxes
are stumpage fees, i.e., charges paid for the right to fell a given volume
of standing timber (drevesina na kornyu). Rental charges only differ from
stumpage fees by the duration for which the right to fell is acquired:
stumpage fees are paid for up to a period of one year, while rental
charges are paid for harvesting activities scheduled to last between one
and forty years. Rental charges, too, are assessed based upon the vol-
ume of standing timber. Although theoretically the rates of stumpage
fees and rental charges are identical, in practice rental charges may be
slightly lower.
Article 106 of the Forest Code provides that for regions where the final
allowable cut exceeds 1 million m3, the receipts of the minimal stumpage
and rental charges are to be apportioned as follows: 40 percent go to
the federal budget and 60 percent are allocated to that region's budget.
The receipts corresponding to the difference between the minimal and
actual rates is reserved for the budgets of the forest management agen-
cies (leskhozy) (Petrov, 1997).
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The forest sector used to figure prominently among regional sources of
revenues. In the early twentieth century, i.e., before Soviet industrializa-
tion, forest taxes raised substantial revenues. In 1904, for example, they
represented 26 percent of the total regional budget revenues (Novgorod
Oblast, 1965, 1976, 1986). This role was dramatically reduced with the
new rules for stumpage fee calculation established in 1949 as well with
the massive industrialization campaign undertaken by Stalin. By the
1960s, the share of forestry-based revenues in regional budget revenues
had been reduced to less than 5 percent, as Table 1 indicates.
Table 1. The Importance of Forest Revenues in Novgorod Oblast.
1964 1971 1982
Forest revenues (th RUB)* 3030 6014 7712
Budget revenues (th RUB) 67124 119500 182500
Share of budget revenues 5% 5% 4%
* Including all forest payments (taxes, fees, fines, etc.). Changes in budget accounting rules
took place between 1960 and 1982.
Source: Novgorod Oblast, 1965, 1976 and 1986.
Nowadays, forestry revenues play an even smaller role, which is the result
of very low stumpage fees. On the national level, average stumpage fees
in 2000 equaled RUB18 per cubic meter. For comparison, in neighboring
Finland, the corresponding figure is US$ 25 per cubic meter, and in Esto-
nia, a country with a transitional economy, US$ 15 per cubic meter. As
Table 2 shows, the share of natural resource user fees in Novgorod's con-
solidated regional budget revenues represented 2.7 percent in 1999, with
stumpage fees accounting for half of that, namely 1.3 percent.
Low stumpage fees and rental incomes lead to the inadequate budget fi-
nancing of leskhozy, whose main task is to ensure the efficiency of for-
estry. This forces leskhozy to engage in commercial activities, to the
detriment of the long-term interests of the forestry sector. Increasing
stumpage fees would give an incentive for better forest management and
exploitation, as this would raise the value of timber resources. Moreover,
additional revenues from higher stumpage fees could be used to reduce
distortionary capital and labor taxes. Such a reform, analyzed in this
paper, could thus lead to fewer tax distortions and more rational re-
source use.
The classical literature on taxation usually does not pay much attention
to natural resources (see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Myles, 1995).
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Table 2. Novgorod Oblast Budget Revenues 1999.
Consolidated Federal* Regional
th RUB % th RUB % th RUB %
Total 2138092 100% 868136 100% 1269956 100%
Corporate profit tax 477800 22.3% 190482 21.9% 287318 22.6%
Personal income tax 343198 16.1% 64073 7.4% 279125 22.0%
Value added tax 197207 9.2% 86741 10.0% 110466 8.7%
Sales tax 161485 7.6% 63091 7.3% 98394 7.7%
Excise taxes 57753 2.7% 43292 5.0% 14461 1.1%
Other taxes on goods
and services 3781 0.2% 2765 0.3% 1016 0.1%
Taxes on imputed incomes 11038 0.5% 1623 0.2% 9415 0.7%
Property tax 154225 7.2% 51482 5.9% 102743 8.1%
Natural resource
user fees 57478 2.7% 9053 1.0% 48425 3.8%
Forest stumpage fees 27773 1.3% 1200 0.1% 26573 2.1%
Land tax 22109 1.0% 3864 0.4% 18245 1.4%
Other taxes 230752 10.8% 1049 0.1% 229703 18.1%
Non-tax revenues 83523 3.9% 4994 0.6% 78529 6.2%
Uncompensated
transfers 359790 16.8% 349429 40.3% 10361 0.8%
Budget funds 62 0.0% 62 0.0% 0 0.0%
* Share of the revenues collected on the territory of Novgorod Oblast that accrues to the fed-
eral government.
Source: Novgorod Oblast Finance Committee.
Forestry taxation is usually analyzed within the problem of optimal rota-
tion (Heaps and Helliwell, 1985). However, since the early 1990s, the
proposal of shifting taxes from capital and labor to pollution has drawn
growing interest from both policy-makers and academics. In the policy
arena, eight European countries so far have embarked on what is usually
referred to as environmental tax reform, in which carbon taxes are usu-
ally substituted for payroll taxes (for a review of the empirical evidence,
see, e.g., Bosquet, 2000). From a theoretical point of view, the shift is
appealing given the possibility of a "double dividend," i.e., environmental
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improvements combined with increased economic efficiency. The prob-
lem of shifting from capital and labor taxes to rental payments is similar
to that of shifting to pollution taxes to the extent that increases in the ef-
ficiency of the tax system and environmental or resource-use improve-
ments can be recorded in both cases. The papers most closely related
to the approach used in this paper include those by Bovenberg and van
der Ploeg (1996, 1998a and 1998b), Koskela and Schoeb (1999).
There are two main approaches to timber rent estimation, both of which
are widely used in developed market economies (e.g., in forest-rich
Canada):
(1) Comparative value pricing system, i.e., netting out of the market tim-
ber price all  costs,
(2) Market pricing system, i.e., econometric estimation of timber rent,
based on forest auction data.
Both of these have been considered within this paper and their applica-
bility to the Russian forestry has been analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the net-back approach to
timber rent estimation is analyzed. In Section 3 the model of timber rent
is presented. In Section 4 timber rent is estimated based on normative
data. In Section 5 timber rent is estimated on the basis of timber auction
data. An analysis of timber rent, estimated on timber auction data, is
given in Section 6. In Section 7 the model of tax shifting from labor to
timber rent is presented and estimates of the effect of tax shifting for
Novgorod Oblast are given. Analysis of the policy implications of changes
in stumpage fees is given in Section 8 and the conclusion is presented in
Section 9.
2. NET-BACK ESTIMATION OF TIMBER RENT
The simple net-back method (netting out all costs, including a fair profit,
from the market timber price) is used in the analysis below.
Appropriated timber rent was estimated for 8 Russian regions (Arkhan-
gelsk, Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Leningrad, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov
and Vologda) and the Russian Federation as a whole using two inde-
pendent data sets.
The first set was compiled from data collected from the 8 regions, based
upon the questionnaire presented in Tables 3 and 4. For each region,
average costs and prices were obtained, covering the range from a cou-
ple of logging firms to all of them. The second data set was taken from
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NIPIEILesprom's database, which comprises cost information on 20000
forest enterprises in the whole of Russia for the year 1998. Production
costs for 1998 were multiplied by the PPI for forestry for 1999, i.e., by
1.572.
Table 3. Estimates of timber rent in selected Russian regions — Equity method
(US$/m3).
Arkhangelsk Khabarovsk
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 16.7 37.9 31.1 72.2
Cost of sales 10.8 17.8 22.6 59.0
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 2.7 8.8 3.0 7.0
Appropriated rent 1.6 9.6 3.9 4.6
Weighted average rent 2.0 4.3
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 21.5 22.2
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 16.7 37.9 31.1 72.2
Cost of sales 11.4 18.3 11.8 48.1
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 1.6 7.7 5.8 9.8
Appropriated rent 2.1 10.1 11.9 12.6
Weighted average rent 2.5 12.3
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 26.9 63.2
Krasnoyarsk Leningrad
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 28.0 120.2 16.9 25.6
Cost of sales 30.3 75.3 11.5 17.0
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 1.2 19.4 3.8 6.2
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Continued from p. 13
Krasnoyarsk Leningrad
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Appropriated rent –5.1 23.9 0.0 0.8
Weighted average rent 3.6 0.3
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 28.0 1.6
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 28.0 120.2 16.9 25.6
Cost of sales 13.5 58.6 5.6 11.1
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 4.3 23.2 3.4 5.7
Appropriated rent 8.5 36.8 6.3 7.1
Weighted average rent 17.0 6.6
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 131.9 32.5
Moscow Novgorod
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 16.9 26.0 22.3 35.8
Cost of sales 12.5 15.4 18.3 28.4
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 2.3 5.5 2.1 6.3
Appropriated rent 0.5 3.5 0.3 –0.5
Weighted average rent 0.9 0.0
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 0.5 0.1
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 16.9 26.0 22.3 35.8
Cost of sales 10.4 13.3 8.2 18.3
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
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Moscow Novgorod
NIPIEILesprom
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Tax take (notional) 1.9 5.1 4.2 7.0
Appropriated rent 2.9 5.9 8.3 8.8
Weighted average rent 3.3 8.5
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 2.0 26.4
Pskov Vologda
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 20.6 32.5 16.2 24.0
Cost of sales 12.0 14.1 13.1 18.7
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 4.7 9.2 1.5 3.3
Appropriated rent 2.3 7.5 0.0 0.3
Weighted average rent 3.4 0.0
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 4.1 0.2
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 20.6 32.5 16.2 24.0
Cost of sales 5.0 7.1 8.9 14.5
Normal profit* 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Tax take (notional) 4.7 9.2 2.2 4.0
Appropriated rent 9.3 14.5 3.5 3.8
Weighted average rent 10.3 3.5
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 12.6 30.0
* % of equity
Sources: Arkhangelsk forest committee (regional average); Khabarovskii Krai administration
(regional average); Krasnoyarskii Krai forest committee (based upon 2 firms); Leningrad
Oblast forest industry committee (regional average); Moscow: VIPKLKh (regional average);
Novgorod: Novgorodlesprom (based upon several firms); Pskov forest committee (based
upon 1 firm); NIPIEILesprom.
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Table 4. Timber rent in Russia — Equity method (US$/m3).
Regions NIPIEILesprom
Dataset
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 21.01 52.56 21.01 52.56
Cost of sales 17.00 34.22 10.21 27.42
Normal profit* 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62
Profit tax take (notional) 2.34 8.90 3.24 9.82
Appropriated rent 0.04 7.83 5.94 13.70
Unrealized rent 12.00 0.00 12.00 0.00
Weighted average appropriated rent 1.86 7.76
Total rent appropriated (US$ mln) 227 944
Capturable unrealized rent (US$ mln) 317 317
Total foregone revenues (US$ mln) 544 1261
* 20% return on equity.
A brief look suffices to denote wide discrepancies between the two data
sets, with the costs reported from each region coming out much higher
than the NIPIEILesprom equivalent. Instead of giving each data set a
different trustworthiness factor, which would be too arbitrary, the ap-
proach will be to take the higher costs from the regions as a higher-
bound estimate and the NIPIEILesprom figures as a lower-bound esti-
mate.
Using both data sets, notional and normal profits, notional tax takes (see
below the corresponding definitions), unit appropriated rent, and fore-
gone revenues were calculated using two different methods — the equity
and the costs methods. Though the data sets are independent, data
from both must be combined to calculate some of the coefficients or
variables in each method, as described below.
The equity method calculates normal profit as a return on equity. This
method corresponds to the "Current Rent Method I" of the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA, 1994, 2000). Revenues are only given by the
first data set and include free on board (FOB) and cost insurance freight
(CIF) prices for round wood. CIF prices are used here as the measure of
revenues. In the regional data set, production costs = production costs
at lower landing – stumpage fees. In the NIPIEILesprom set, production
costs are taken as such. Then, in the regional data set, the cost of
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sales = production costs at lower landing + transport tariffs + handling
costs; and, in the NIPIEILesprom set, the cost of sales = production
costs + transport tariffs + handling costs. Transport tariffs and handling
costs are only available from the regional data set. Next, a notional
gross profit is calculated, which is the gross margin that can be
estimated based upon the available revenues and costs: notional gross
profit = revenues – cost of sales. Using the regional data set, the no-
tional tax take, which is the tax liability that would be due if all taxes were
properly assessed and collected = notional gross profit × 30% (if no-
tional gross profit > 0) + stumpage fees + export duties. Using the
NIPIEILesprom set, notional tax take = notional gross profit × 30% (if no-
tional gross profit > 0) + export duties (stumpage fees are included in
production costs and cannot be dissociated). All other taxes, in particular
social security contributions, are included in production costs in both
data sets. For the purpose of estimating normal profit, a standard return
on equity was reconstructed for the whole Russian logging sector in the
following manner. Total assets in the Russian logging sector had a book
value of RUB 28.6 billion in 1998.1 Investments in 1999 amounted to
just over RUB 2 billion while depreciation amounted to just over RUB 1
billion. Converting each figure in US$ at the appropriate exchange rate
and using the average equity-to-assets ratio in the logging sector of
70%, total equity in the logging sector in 1999 was around US$ 987 mil-
lion. The central rate of 20% (Eurobond 2007 average 2000 yield plus a
premium of around 5%) was selected for the Russian forest sector.2
Given this rate and the timber cut for main usage of 122 million cubic
meters, the standard normal profit on equity for the Russian logging
sector for 1999 was estimated at US$ 1.62/m3 (Burdin et al., 2000;
Sakhanov, 2000). Then, the unit appropriated rent = notional gross
profit – notional tax take – normal profit. Since the unit appropriated rent
is estimated for both domestic sales and exports, it is necessary to
weight each figure by relative sales shares: weighted unit appropriated
rent = unit appropriated rent on domestic sales × domestic sales
share + unit appropriated rent on exports × export share. The total ap-
propriated rent or foregone revenues = weighted unit appropriated
rent × total timber cut for main usage.
Table 3 gives the synthesis for each region and both data sets, while Ta-
ble 4 gives the aggregated results for Russia as a whole. Using the re-
                                               
1 Book values tend to over-represent reality given some of the peculiarities of the
Russian accounting system. As a consequence, the calculated normal profit might
itself be overestimated and the appropriated rent underestimated.
2 NIPIEILesprom recommends 25% as a normal rate of return on capital in the
logging sector, but that seems too high as the rate for the baseline scenario.
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gional data set as the lower bound estimate and the NIPIEILesprom as
the upper bound estimate, the interval for appropriated rent on round
wood is around US$ 1.9–7.8/m3, which means foregone revenues of
around US$ 227–944 million per year. In addition, revenues are foregone
because part of the rent is unrealized (see below).
Table 5 identifies the various components of rent averaged across do-
mestic sales and exports, based upon the data in Table 4. It is worth
noting that the forest sector generates a large total rent. The govern-
ment captures about US$ 4/m3 (or 20%) of the total rent, while less than
US$ 2/m3 (or 10%) is earned by forest enterprises and intermediaries as
normal and excess profit. The largest portion of the rent (US$ 9.69/m3
or 57%) is dissipated through the local economy as unrealized rent.
Based upon the main usage cut of 121.6 million cubic meters in 1999,
the total implicit subsidy to the domestic economy amounts to US$ 900
million. However, total implicit subsidy does not equal foregone reve-
nues. If all the wood sold domestically were in fact exported, some addi-
tional revenues would be generated on these US$ 9.69/m3. This amount,
US$ 9.69/m3, would be the total additional before-tax revenues for the
exporter, of which 30% could be taxed away by profit tax and 5% taken
away by  export duty. Of the unrealized rent, 35% would thus turn into
public revenues, i.e., US$ 3.40/m3, which has been factored into Tables
4 and 5 under "capturable unrealized rent." The remaining 65% would
be added to the rent appropriated, which, conservatively, has not been
reflected in the tables.
Table 5. Total timber rent in Russia — Equity method (US$/m3).
Regions NIPIEILesprom
Unrealized rent (implicit subsidy) 9.69 9.69
Entrepreneurial rent (normal profit) 1.62 1.62
Captured rent (notional tax take) 3.85 4.76
Appropriated rent (excess profit) 1.86 7.76
Total rent 17.03 23.82
However, the real effective subsidy to the national economy may be un-
derestimated. First, the salvage logging and thinnings undertaken by
leskhozy do not generate any revenues and are an additional implicit
subsidy. In 1999, for example, these cuts amounted to 22.9 million cubic
meters, or 19% of the main usage. Second, part of the logging waste
should be included as unrealized rent as well. However, conservatively,
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neither salvage logging or thinning nor logging waste is captured in
Table 5.
The costs method estimates normal profit as a percentage of production
costs. Although profit is usually not measured as a proportion of costs,
this benchmark has in fact been used in the forest sector in the Komi
Republic, which is why the method is replicated here. All variables are
calculated as in the equity method, except normal profit. Here, normal
profit = production costs × coefficient 15%. Fifteen percent is the rate
that was used in the Komi Republic in 1999.
Table 6 gives the synthesis for each region and both data sets, while Ta-
ble 7 gives the aggregated results for Russia as a whole. Using the re-
gional data set as the lower bound estimate and the NIPIEILesprom as
the upper bound estimate, the interval for appropriated rent on round
wood is in the region of US$ 1.6–8.5/m3, and total foregone revenues
amount to US$ 191–1032 million per year, to which, as above, 35% of
the unrealized rent should be added to obtain the likely total foregone
revenues.
Table 6. Estimates of timber rent in selected Russian regions — Costs method
(US$/m3).
Arkhangelsk Khabarovsk
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 16.7 37.9 31.1 72.2
Cost of sales 10.8 17.8 22.6 59.0
Normal profit* 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
Tax take (notional) 2.7 8.8 3.0 7.0
Appropriated rent 2.3 10.3 2.6 3.2
Weighted average rent 2.7 2.9
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 28.6 15.1
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 16.7 37.9 31.1 72.2
Cost of sales 11.4 18.3 11.8 48.1
Normal profit* 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4
Tax take (notional) 1.6 7.7 5.8 9.8
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Arkhangelsk Khabarovsk
NIPIEILesprom
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Appropriated rent 2.7 10.7 12.2 12.8
Weighted average rent 3.1 12.6
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 33.1 64.5
Krasnoyarsk Leningrad
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 28.0 120.2 16.9 25.6
Cost of sales 30.3 75.3 11.5 17.0
Normal profit* 3.7 3.7 1.4 1.4
Tax take (notional) 1.2 19.4 3.8 6.2
Appropriated rent –7.1 21.8 0.2 1.1
Weighted average rent 1.5 0.6
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 12.0 3.0
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 28.0 120.2 16.9 25.6
Cost of sales 13.5 58.6 5.6 11.1
Normal profit* 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.5
Tax take (notional) 4.3 23.2 3.4 5.7
Appropriated rent 9.0 37.3 7.4 8.3
Weighted average rent 17.5 7.8
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 135.3 38.1
Moscow Novgorod
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 16.9 26.0 22.3 35.8
Cost of sales 12.5 15.4 18.3 28.4
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Moscow Novgorod
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Normal profit* 0.9 0.9 2.0 2.0
Tax take (notional) 2.3 5.5 2.1 6.3
Appropriated rent 1.2 4.2 0.0 –0.9
Weighted average rent 1.6 –0.3
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 1.0 –0.9
NIPIEILesprom
Revenues (CIF price) 16.9 26.0 22.3 35.8
Cost of sales 10.4 13.3 8.2 18.3
Normal profit* 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
Tax take (notional) 1.9 5.1 4.2 7.0
Appropriated rent 3.9 6.9 9.5 10.0
Weighted average rent 4.3 9.7
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 2.6 30.1
Pskov Vologda
Regions
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 20.6 32.5 16.2 24.0
Cost of sales 12.0 14.1 13.1 18.7
Normal profit * 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3
Tax take (notional) 4.7 9.2 1.5 3.3
Appropriated rent 2.8 8.0 0.3 0.6
Weighted average rent 3.8 0.3
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 4.7 2.6
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Pskov Vologda
NIPIEILesprom
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 20.6 32.5 16.2 24.0
Cost of sales 5.0 7.1 8.9 14.5
Normal profit * 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7
Tax take (notional) 4.7 9.2 2.2 4.0
Appropriated rent 10.8 16.0 4.4 4.7
Weighted average rent 11.8 4.4
Total foregone revenues
(US$ mln/yr) 14.4 37.7
* % of production costs.
Sources: Arkhangelsk forest committee (regional average); Khabarovskii Krai administration
(regional average); Krasnoyarskii Krai forest committee (based upon 2 firms); Leningrad
Oblast forest industry committee (regional average); Moscow: VIPKLKh (regional average);
Novgorod: Novgorodlesprom (based upon several firms); Pskov forest committee (based
upon 1 firm); NIPIEILesprom.
Table 7. Timber rent in Russia — Costs method (US$/m3).
Regions NIPIEILesprom
Data set
Domestic Export Domestic Export
Revenues (CIF price) 21.01 52.56 21.01 52.56
Cost of sales 17.00 34.22 10.21 27.42
Normal profit * 1.92 1.92 0.90 0.90
Profit tax take (notional) 2.34 8.90 3.24 9.82
Appropriated rent (0.25) 7.53 6.66 14.43
Unrealized rent 12.00 0.00 12.00 0.00
Weighted average appropriated rent 1.57 8.49
Total rent appropriated (US$ mln) 191 1032
Capturable unrealized rent (US$ mln) 317 317
Total foregone revenues (US$ mln) 508 1349
* 15% return on costs.
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Table 8 distinguishes between the various components of rent averaged
across domestic sales and exports, based upon Table 7. The only differ-
ence compared to Table 5 is the distribution between normal and excess
profit.
Table 8. Total timber rent in Russia — Costs method (US$/m3).
Regions NIPIEILesprom
Unrealized rent (implicit subsidy) 9.69 9.69
Entrepreneurial rent (normal profit) 1.92 0.90
Captured rent (notional tax take) 3.85 4.76
Appropriated rent (excess profit) 1.57 8.49
Total rent 17.03 23.82
As illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, cost data are generally not
reliable and vary across sources, and selecting a normal profit rate rep-
resents an arbitrary decision. The net-back method therefore provides a
rather inaccurate estimation of the timber rent.
3. TIMBER RENT MODELING
Next, we turn to the second approach of timber rent estimation. In order
to estimate timber rent using this approach, the factors that define this
rent should first be specified. The following main rent-creation factors
have been defined:
(1) Volume per tree. This factor affects labor and capital productivity,
which is mirrored in the existing norms. The volume per tree is
equivalent to the quality of the standing timber, the so-called bonitet.
Usually, the volume per tree falls into the range of 0.2–1.0 cubic
meter.
(2) Hauling distance. This is the distance from the forest plot to the
nearest highway, railroad or river. At present in Russia hauling
distances increase with the passage of time as no new roads are
built. Distance affects only the productivity of trucks that carry the
felled trees. In what follows, river transportation will not be con-
sidered.
(3) Soil type and slope. This factor affects transportation productivity. It
influences the cost of building and maintaining roads.
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(4) Type of timber (e.g., coniferous or deciduous). This factor is re-
flected in timber prices and does not affect logging costs.
At this stage, we do not take into account factor (3), which influences
the construction and maintenance of roads because, at present, timber
is logged only along existing roads. No new roads are being built.
Assume that a logging company has acquired the right to exploit a given
timber plot with an area of A hectares. Then the area of the timber plot Y
that the company will log within a year will correspond to the following
production function:
( , , , , )Y F K L A Q d= ,   0
F
Q
∂
<
∂
,   0
F
d
∂
<
∂
, (1)
where K stands for capital, L — for labor, Q — for volume per tree, and
d — for the distance from the timber plot to the nearest railroad (high-
way). ()F ⋅  is linearly homogeneous in K, L and A. The production func-
tion is assumed to be separable, of the type
( , , , , ) [ ( , ), ] ( , )F K L A Q d H K L A g Q d= Φ , (2)
where the function ( , )x yΦ  is linearly homogeneous in x, y. Then, from
(1) and (2),
( , )
H
Y A g Q d
A
ϕ  =    . (3)
As has been stated above, the period T of exploitation of a given timber
plot is given exogenously. Then, using the equality A YT= , from (3) it
follows that
( , ) ( ) ( , )Y H K L u T G Q d= ,   0
G
Q
∂
<
∂
,   0
G
d
∂
<
∂
. (4)
Since at the level of a logging enterprise, substitution possibilities be-
tween capital and labor are very limited, the function ( , )H K L  is assumed
to be of a Leontief type. Then, under conditions of an optimal mix of
capital and labor used in production ( L DK= ), and assuming the follow-
ing specification of the function ( , )G Q d ,
( , ) dG Q d Q eµ δ− −= ; (5)
from (4) we get
( ) dY B T KQ eµ δ− −= . (6)
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Timber rent per hectare of forest plot is defined as the market price of
timber net of logging costs:
F KP S P k wlρ = − − , (7)
where FP  stands for the market price of timber, net of the transportation
costs along highway or railroad; KP  is the cost of capital, including
capital depreciation and normative profit; w is labor wage; k is the
amount of capital per hectare (more precisely, the number machine-
years per hectare of timber logged); l is the amount of labor per hectare
(more accurately, the number of man-years per hectare of timber
logged); and S is the volume of timber per hectare of standing timber,
which depends on timber quality (bonitet), i.e., on timber volume per
tree:
( )S Q= Ψ . (8)
k is defined from (6):
dQ e
k
B
µ δ
= . (9)
From (7)–(9) the following expression for timber rent can be derived:
( ) dKF
P wD
P Q Q e
B
µ δρ += Ψ − . (10)
Equation (10) has been obtained under the condition that there are no
taxes. In case loggers have to pay payroll tax Lτ  and profit tax Kτ , tim-
ber rent per hectare will be as follows:
( ) (1 )
(1 )
dK K
F L
K
P D
P Q w Q e
D B
µ δντρ τ
τ
 −
= Ψ − + + 
− 
, (11)
where ν — tax exempt capital depreciation rate.
Assuming that ( )Q QζχΨ = , timber rent per cubic meter in the presence
of taxes will be
(1 )
(1 )
dK K
F L
K
P D
P w Q e
D B
µ ζ δντρ τ
τ χ
−
 −
= − + + 
− 
. (12)
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4. TIMBER RENT ESTIMATION BASED ON NORMATIVE DATA
To estimate production function (2), we first use normative data on
capital and labor productivities, which depend on the characteristics of
the timber stand. The practice of norm setting for logging was intro-
duced within the former centrally planned economy, when the norms of
the main factor (labor, capital, energy) usage were the basis of current
planning. These norms were set by research institutes on the basis of
particular observation methods (e.g., fixing all the operations and their
duration, etc.). At present, this practice is used for state-owned enter-
prises (leskhozy), which in 1999 cut about 25 million cubic meters of
timber. Since leskhozy are financed by the state budget, setting norms
for production factor use is obligatory when forming the leskhoz budget.
These norms are being set by the Russian state institute "Rosgiproles"
and include:
1) Output logging norms under different technologies and equipment,
2) Norms for energy and other material consumption.
To calculate depreciation, the norms set by the Ministry of Economy are
used. The logging norms, relative to imported equipment (adjusted for
Russian conditions), are kindly supplied by Finnish organizations (e.g.,
Rauma–Reppola office in Moscow).
The norms of production factor use (e.g., labor intensity, fuel consump-
tion, output-capital ratio) are differentiated according to the following
factors that influence productivity:
• type of trees,
• volume per tree,
• skidding distance,
• season of the year,
• hauling distance,
• slope,
• soil characteristics.
The following logging technologies have been considered:
(A) Logging using manual labor. The following steps and equipment are
involved:
• felling by chainsaw (Husqvarna), branch trimming by chainsaw
(Husqvarna),
• skidding by machine (TT-4),
• cross-cutting by chainsaw (Husqvarna),
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• loading by machine (LT-65B),
• hauling by truck (KRAZ).
(B) Mechanized logging using domestically produced equipment, which
includes the following steps and equipment:
• felling by machine (LP-19),
• branch trimming by machine (LP-33),
• skidding by machine (LP-18),
• cross-cutting by chainsaw (Husqvarna),
• loading by machine (LT-65B),
• hauling by truck (KRAZ).
(C) Highly mechanized logging using imported equipment, which in-
cludes the following steps and equipment:
• felling, branch trimming, skidding and cross-cutting by Harvester,
• loading and hauling by Forwarder.
We have assumed equipment productivity in line with the norms currently
accepted in Russia. Under technologies A and B, the limiting step is
hauling. Data on productivity and the corresponding prices are presented
in Table 9.
Table 9. Productivity and Prices of Capital.
Machines used Price, Th RUB Productivity, m3 per shift
Tree felling
Husqvarna 12.8 115
LP-19 795 181
Harvester 14430 100
Skidding
ÒÒ-4 285 79
LP-18 660 90
Branch cutting
LP-33 825 150
Husqvarna 40.5
Cross cutting
Husqvarna 125.5
Loading
LT-65b 550 114
Hauling
KRAZ 455 38.7
Forwarder 13595 60
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The productivity of equipment depends on the main rent-formation fac-
tors (volume per tree, hauling distance, etc.), which are presented in Ta-
bles 10 and 11. The reference values for the volume per tree and hauling
distance are, respectively, 0.3 cubic meters and 30 km. A typical set of
normative data on logging costs that have been used for production
function estimation are presented in Table 12.
Table 10. Relationship between equipment productivity and average volume per
tree.
Volume per tree, cubic meters
Machine
0.19 0.35 0.61
Tree felling
Husqvarna 0.69 1 1.27
LP-19 0.71 1 1.30
Harvester 0.89 1 1.33
Skidding
LP8 0.86 1 1.29
ÒÒ-4 0.85 1 1.17
Branch cutting
Husqvarna 0.70 1 1.30
LP-33 0.71 1 1.20
Cross cutting
Husqvarna 0.80 1 1.20
Loading
LT-65B 0.82 1 1.25
Table 11. Hauling productivity as a function of hauling distance.
Hauling Distance, km
Machine
Up to 20 20.1–40 40.1–60 More than 60
KRAZ 1.2 1 0.85 0.74
Forwarder 1.3 1 0.89 0.80
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Table 12. Normative data on logging.
Hauling Distance
Procedure
10 km 20 km 30 km 50 km 60 km 100 km
Felling by chain saw
(Husqvarna)
20 20 20 20 20 20
Cutting Branches by
chain saw (Husqvarna)
25 25 25 25 25 25
Skidding ( ÒÒ-4) 17 17 17 17 17 17
Cross-cutting by chain
saw (Husqvarna)
16 16 16 16 16 16
Loading (LT-65B) 12 12 12 12 12 12
Hauling (KRAZ) 18 19 21 25 28 41
Capital (th RUB) 20416 20871 21781 23601 24966 30881
Amount of Labor 162 163 167 173 177 196
Volume of timber cut: 200 thousands of cubic meters.
Volume of timber per hectare: 100 cubic meters.
Average volume per tree: 0.19.
Area cut in a year: 2000 hectares.
Logging Technology: A
The volume per hectare depends on the volume per tree, as is shown in
Table 13. The data presented in Table 13 are, to a certain extent, condi-
tional, since in practice there are a number of distorting factors, e.g., the
existence of small trees, which are uneconomical to harvest. From Table
13 it follows that the volume per hectare is approximately a linear func-
Table 13. Relationship of the volume per tree and volume of timber per hectare.
Volume of timber per 1 hectare,
cubic meters
Average volume per tree,
cubic meters
100 0.19
150 0.25
200 0.38
250 0.50
350 0.73
450 0.95
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tion of the volume per tree, i.e., 1ζ ≈ . Estimation of equation (6) for the
three technologies yields the following results (t-statistics in parenthe-
ses):
Technology A:
ln(Y) – ln(K) = –3.5207 – 0.7297∙ln(Q) – 0.0052∙d, (13)
(–139.7717)  (–38.378)      (–14.6009),
R2 = 0.9808.
Technology B:
ln(Y) – ln(K) = –4.0903 – 0.5843∙ln(Q) – 0.0031∙d, (14)
(–118.7347)  (–22.9502)     (–6.5573),
R2 = 0.9478.
Technology C:
ln(Y) – ln(K) = –6.1523 – 0.7554∙ln(Q) – 0.0063∙d, (15)
(–236.2725)  (–38.4333)    (–16.8827),
R2 = 0.9816.
It can be noted that for technologies A and C the main estimated pa-
rameters are quite close, while for technology B they differ from those
for technologies A and C.
As an alternative to the Leontief type of production function H(K,L), the
following Cobb–Douglas specification has also been estimated:
dF BK L Q eβ µα δ− −= . (6')
Estimation of equation (6') in log-linear form for the three logging tech-
nologies yields (t-statistics in parentheses):
Technology A:
ln( )
2.6014 0.8676ln( ) 0.0468ln( ) 0.7356ln( ) 0.0043 ,
( 1.3335) (2.2616) (0.2001) ( 11.2390) ( 4.3907),
F
K L Q d
=
= − + + − −
− − −
(16)
R2 = 0.9796.
Technology B:
ln( )
4.8657 1.1486ln( ) 0.1849ln( ) 0.6360ln( ) 0.0025 ,
( 9.2449) (13.3273) ( 2.1551) ( 35.1749) ( 7.0675),
F
K L Q d
=
= − + − − −
− − − −
(17)
R2 =  0.9849.
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Technology C:
ln( )
1.1427 0.4389ln( ) 0.5915ln( ) 0.7149ln( ) 0.0051 ,
( 0.7547) (2.7207) (3.9408) ( 36.5309) ( 12.8763),
F
K L Q d
=
= − + + − −
− − −
(18)
R2 = 0.9807.
The above presented estimation results clearly point at the inadequacy
of a Cobb–Douglas specification of the production function.
Having estimated the parameters of the production function, one may
calculate the timber rent for a given set of rent-forming factors. The re-
sults of the timber rent calculations may be summarized as follows:
(1) For a given range of parameters — volume per tree, hauling distance,
cost of capital and labor wages — the most profitable technology is C,
and the least profitable is A.
(2) Technology B yields rent that is intermediate between timber rents
yielded by logging technologies A and C.
(3) This state of affairs remains unchanged for any plausible set of pa-
rameters.
These results appear rather unexpected because of the huge differences
in capital costs between technologies A and B, on one hand, and tech-
nology C, on the other hand, and because labor costs in Russia are very
low. The reason why technology C is not widely used in Russia is that
logging companies do not have money for such investments.
Other types of production functions were also tried, but the results were
generally worse than with the Leontief type specification.
All attempts to estimate production function parameters based on the
data supplied by logging companies failed due to the extremely low
quality of the data. This result is consistent with the data presented in
Table 14, according to which practically all logging companies in the
Komi Republic in 1997 were loss-making (meaning negative timber rent).
5. TIMBER RENT ESTIMATION BASED ON AUCTION DATA
Though timber rent estimation based on normative data is very useful,
one should keep in mind that the actual state of affairs may be different
from the norms set by the authorities. Under the present conditions pre-
vailing in the forestry sector in Russia, an important source of informa-
tion could be forest auctions where forest plots are sold for logging.
In 1998, 15% of all the timber cut in Russia has been sold at timber
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Table 14. Data from forest enterprises in the Komi Republic (1997).
Name Legal status
Volume
of timber cut
(1000 m3)
Average timber
price RUB/m3
Average cost
RUB/m3
1. Kyltovsky AO 39.7 98.6 136.7
2. Sysolsky AO 219.0 72.7 86.4
3. Palauzsky AO 92.6 86.0 91.0
4. Ust-Vyisky AO 35.1 75.0 137.0
5. Timshersky AO 94.9 90.0 120.0
6. Prupsky AO 122.0 70.0 94.0
7. Ust-Kulomles AO 83.0 68.0 157.8
8. Parma AO 134.1 67.8 139.8
9. Ust-Nemsky Public 145.4 60.8 107.0
10. Pomozdinskles TOO 130.4 73.0 87.0
11. Kortkers AO 74.2 76.0 98.0
12. Yasnogles TOO 42.2 81.8 124.0
13. Parma AOZT 83.2 85.0 110.0
14. Pechorsky AO 75.1 94.9 250.6
15. Obyachevsky TOO 124.1 64.0 100.5
16. Syktyvdinsky AO 201.3 69.6 103.1
17. Ukhtales AO 78.9 95.3 164.2
18. Borovskoy OOO 104.2 65.0 103.0
19. Undorsky AO 26.7 88.6 146.6
TOTAL 1906.1 74.1 117.8
Source: All-Russia Institute of Continuous Education in Forestry's own calculations.
auctions. It should be noted that on average in Russia timber auction
prices are about two times higher than stumpage fees (see Table 15).
Selling timber at auctions is organized according to the procedures set
by the Forest Code of the Russian Federation (articles 43–45) (GOR,
1997) and by regulations on forest auctions approved by the Russian
Forest Service (#99 of August 11, 1997). To carry out a forest auction,
an auction commission is set, its members being approved by regional
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Table 15. Average timber stumpage fees and auction prices in Russia
(RUB/m3).
1996 1997 1998
1999
(1st quarter)
Region
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TOTAL 7.9 26.3 10.1 24.5 10.1 20.0 12.3
1. Arkhangelsk Oblast 8.0 16.8 9.0 12.2 9.3 16.6 9.0
2. Vologda Oblast 11.0 31.2 13.0 – 7.0 11.6 11.0
3. Republic of Karelia 7.0 – 14.0 38.2 12.1 – 15.0
4. Republic of Komi 5.0 10.6 5.0 – 7.2 8.6 7.0
5. Leningrad Oblast 7.3 23.8 9.5 25.8 13.3 37.5 17.2
6. Novgorod Oblast 7.0 31.2 10.0 24.3 15.0 21.6 24.0
7. Pskov Oblast 12.0 40.0 13.0 38.2 13.9 25.8 25.5
8. Bryansk Oblast 17.0 94.3 27.0 60.3 37.0 60.8 48.0
9. Vladimir Oblast 13.0 67.9 12.1 72.0 15.0 64.8 15.1
10. Kostroma Oblast 11.0 21.3 11.0 18.7 11.0 19.0 17.0
11. Moscow Oblast 9.3 39.1 13.1 36.0 14.0 34.7 24.0
12. Smolensk Oblast 13.0 37.9 17.0 51.5 22.2 26.7 22.0
13. Yaroslav Oblast 10.0 42.1 10.0 – 13.6 23.8 14.9
14. Nizhny-Novgorod
Oblast 6.8 22.2 8.5 24.3 20.0 34.9 14.0
15. Perm Oblast 6.0 31.7 6.3 43.5 12.0 33.4 9.0
16. Sverdlovsk Oblast 5.5 42.9 11.6 28.6 10.8 9.2 12.1
17. Tomsk Oblast 5.0 24.9 7.0 10.5 8.0 12.7 10.0
18. Tyumen Oblast 10.8 30.5 14.0 27.2 11.6 28.2 13.0
19. Krasnoyarsk
Region 4.2 12.9 5.0 10.0 6.0 10.3 6.3
20. Primorsky Region 7.0 – 8.9 – 8.5 20.9 21.0
21. Khabarovsk Region 8.0 – 9.0 11.7 18.0 13.0 18.0
22. Kaliningrad Oblast 32.8 123.3 39.9 98.4 87.5 85.8 220.6
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authorities. Regional authorities, according to Article 45 of the Forest
Code (GOR, 1997), are given all the rights to manage and to use the
forests, which are within federal property. Within the auction commission
there are representatives of a territorial branch of the regional Forest
Service, municipalities and leskhoz. Leskhoz organizes the auction.
Depending on the importance of the forest auctions, they are held as on-
the-spot trades only or, which is usually the case, they include written
bids submitted in sealed envelopes. The particular procedure is set by
the auction organizer (leskhoz). For selling small scale volumes of timber
to local consumers, on-the-spot trades are used.
According to the regulation on forest auctions, possible bidders should
be informed at least 30 days in advance. Unfortunately, this information
is usually not advertised in mass media and is of an insider character.
This factor, as well as the role of local authorities (lobbying for the inter-
ests of local bidders) make auctions not very competitive, with the num-
ber of bidders being, in many cases, not more than 2–3 (according to
the regulation, there cannot be less than 2 bidders taking part in a tim-
ber auction).
The initial price of timber at the auction is set by leskhoz and equals the
minimal stumpage fee set at a federal level, multiplied by a coefficient
set by regional authorities. Minimal values of stumpage fees for the
Novgorod Oblast are presented in Table 16.
The winner of the auction has to fell timber within a certain period, to
clean the forest plot and to recultivate it. The winner cannot resell the
right to exploit the forest plot to a third party.
The following information is made public:
• leskhoz name;
• particular forest plot;
• the year;
• forest type;
• forest plot area;
• felling technology;
• skidding distance;
• availability of roads and hauling distance;
• volume per tree;
• topography;
• soil type;
• timber distribution, relative to types and dimensions of trees.
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Table 16. Selected Minimal Stumpage fees in Novgorod Oblast.
Minimal rate (RUB/m3)
Merchantable woodSpecies
Tax
category
Hauling
distance (km)
Wide Medium Thin
Firewood
Pine 1 < 10 52.4 37.4 18.8 1.5
2 10.1–25 47.6 34.0 16.9 1.4
3 25.1–40 40.5 28.8 14.6 1.0
4 40.1–60 30.9 22.1 11.2 0.9
5 60.1–80 23.8 16.9 8.5 0.8
6 80.1–100 19.0 13.6 6.9 0.7
7 > 100.1 14.3 10.2 5.0 0.6
Birch 1 < 10 26.2 18.8 9.5 1.7
2 10.1–25 23.8 16.9 8.5 1.5
3 25.1–40 20.4 14.6 7.1 1.4
4 40.1–60 15.7 11.2 5.5 1.2
5 60.1–80 11.9 8.5 4.5 0.9
6 80.1–100 9.5 6.9 3.4 0.7
7 > 100.1 7.1 5.0 2.7 0.4
Source: GOR 1999.
At present, at the auctions the highest quality forest plots are sold, which
are close to roads, thus relieving the loggers of road construction costs.
The latter argument is the most important one, stimulating selling timber
at auctions. This policy leads to a low level of investment in road con-
struction, which will result in serious problems when all "convenient" for-
est plots will have been cut.
Information on forest auctions has been obtained from leskhozy. A typi-
cal pattern of data on auctions that have been used for econometric es-
timation is given in Table 17. All in all, data on 156 auctions that were
held in the Novgorod Oblast in 1999 were used in the estimations.
In the estimations, the auction price AP  served as a dependent variable,
while the explanatory variables included type of trees (coniferous or de-
ciduous), timber quality (volume per tree), and hauling distance. It
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should be noted that since the price at which a logger sells timber is not
observable, it cannot be used as an explanatory variable.
Table 17. Auction data. Economic characteristics of timber auctions sales, ac-
cording to the data of Novgorod Forest Service (1999).
Leskhoz Volume per tree,
cub.m
Volume per ha,
cub.m
Hauling distance,
km
Tree type
formula
1 2 3 4 5
Batetsky 0.36 200 14 6Á2Îñ2Å
Borovichi 0.40 250 25 2Ñ4Å2Á2Îñ
Valdai 0.45 250 10 6Å1Ñ2Á1Îñ
Volotovsky 0.35 130 15 5Á5Îñ+Å
L
e
sk
h
o
z
A
u
c
ti
o
n
 d
a
te
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
tr
a
d
e
s
(p
lo
ts
)
V
o
lu
m
e
 o
f 
sa
le
s,
c
u
b
.m
0
 d
e
c
id
u
o
u
s,
1
 c
o
n
if
e
ro
u
s
A
u
c
ti
o
n
 p
ri
c
e
ru
b
/c
u
b
.m
M
in
im
a
l 
st
u
m
p
a
g
e
fe
e
, 
ru
b
/c
u
b
.m
P
lo
t 
a
re
a
, 
h
a
1 6 7 8 9 10 11 13
Batetsky 1 quarter 5 1000 1 42.00 23.20 5
49 17300 0 18.90 9.92 86.5
2 quarter 3 700 1 23.18 14.82 3.5
8 1500 0 21.31 10.56 7.5
3 quarter 3 1000 1 23.18 14.82 5
14 5100 0 26.74 10.60 25.5
4 quarter 3 1300 1 62.05 18.50 6.5
30 10300 0 34.30 11.62 51.5
Borovichi 1 quarter 3 19100 1 80.98 15.74 76.4
21 6600 0 35.76 9.02 26.4
2 quarter 3 6500 1 87.07 17.61 26
11 3500 0 45.88 9.17 14
3 quarter 3 4600 1 94.66 18.10 18.4
11 1800 0 46.57 9.15 7.2
4 quarter 3 8600 1 95.53 17.16 34.4
9 1600 0 46.84 9.07 6.4
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Valdai 1 quarter 2 2700 1 103.30 13.63 10.8
7 700 0 41.00 12.57 2.8
2 quarter 1 103.30 13.63
0 41.00 12.57
3 quarter 1 1800 1 130.84 22.24 7.2
2 0 41.00 12.57
4 quarter 1 3400 1 154.32 26.68 13.6
11 2900 0 65.81 15.72 11.6
Volotovsky 1 quarter 4 1
8 2900 0 24.38 20.40 22.3
2 quarter 1 1
2 1100 0 29.63 7.50 8.5
3 quarter 2 1
7 5000 0 35.93 9.16 38.5
4 quarter 4 1
As the first step, the following linear specification has been used:
1 2 3 4AP c c TYPE c Q c d= + + + , (19)
where TYPE is a dummy variable, equal to zero if deciduous timber was
sold at the auction and equal to unity otherwise. The estimation results
are as follows (t-statistics in parentheses):
7.1458 18.3557 125.2861 0.3187 ,
( 0.5062) (7.2177) (3.5923) ( 3.4373),
AP
TYPE Q d
=
= − + + −
− −
(20)
R2 = 0.3754.
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Except for the constant term, all of the estimated coefficients are of
correct signs and statistically significant at the 1% level.
As the volume of sales differs substantially from one auction to another,
a weighted estimation of the same function (19) has been carried out.
The results of this estimation are as follows (t-statistics in parentheses):
17.6627 21.8858 141.8184 0.1724 ,
( 1.7364) (9.4919) (5.6018) ( 1.7383),
AP
TYPE Q d
=
= − + + −
− −
(21)
R2 = 0.9269.
It is clearly seen that weighting by volume leads to a significantly higher
value of R2. Though the signs of the estimated coefficients are the same
as before, their values have somewhat changed and the coefficient at
the hauling distance is statistically significant only at the 10% level.
However, in spite of the quite satisfactory results of the linear regression
estimation, it does not allow for the estimation of the price at which log-
gers sell timber and of logging costs. As has been mentioned above, the
available data on logging costs are extremely unreliable. To overcome
the shortcomings of linear regression, nonlinear specification of the
function defining auction price should be used for the estimation. Since
in a competitive market, auction price should equal timber rent, the fol-
lowing nonlinear specification for auction price, corresponding to (10),
may be used:
4
1 2 3 5exp( )
c
AP c c TYPE c Q c d= + + . (22)
This specification of the estimated function has a clear economic in-
terpretation. The first two terms on the right-hand-side of the equa-
tion correspond to the timber market price for either deciduous or
coniferous trees, while the third term on the right-hand-side corre-
sponds to logging costs, which depend on timber quality and hauling
distance ( 3 0c < ).
However, in estimating equation (22), we face difficulties, due to its non-
linearity. To overcome this problem, the above given results of estimating
the production function based on normative data (coefficients µ  and δ )
have been used. This suggestion is supported by the notion that the
coefficients 4 1c µ= −  and 5c δ=  in (22) are essentially technological
and, generally speaking, are not subject to significant market influence.
Since presently, the most widespread technology used in logging
is technology A, the following values of µ  and δ , obtained within the
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normative approach for this technology, have been used in subsequent
estimations: µ  = 0.7297, δ  = 0.0052.
The estimation of equation (22) under exogenously given coefficients 4c
and 5c  produces the following result (t-statistics in parentheses):
1195.5105 22.4353 127.6107 ,
(5.7221) (6.9888) ( 4.6829),
d
AP TYPE Q e
µ δ− ⋅
= + −
−
(23)
R2 = 0.4237.
As in the case of linear specification of the auction price, a weighted es-
timation of equation (22) under exogenously given coefficients 4c  and
5c  has also been carried out. Estimation produces the following result
(t-statistics in parentheses):
1183.1009 21.4318 117.2127 ,
(5.5716) (7.5717) ( 4.5003),
d
AP TYPE Q e
µ δ− ⋅
= + −
−
(24)
R2 = 0.9472.
Again, weighting significantly increases the value of R2. An important
problem concerning the estimation of the above regression is the stabil-
ity of the estimation results with respect to the values of the exogenous
parameters ( µ  and δ ). To check it, the dependence of the estimated
coefficients 1 3,c c  on µ  has been calculated (Fig. 1). It is clearly seen
that the estimated coefficients are relatively stable with respect to
changes in µ . With respect to δ , estimation results are significantly
more robust.
6. ANALYSIS OF ESTIMATION RESULTS
The estimation results yield two important outcomes:
• market timber prices in the Novgorod Oblast ( ≈ RUB 300/m3 for
coniferous timber) are significantly higher than those obtained from
the estimations based on auction data ( ≈ RUB 200/m3);
• logging costs, estimated on the basis of the normative approach,
are twice as low as those estimated on the basis of auction data,
while the latter are nearly twice as low as the logging costs re-
ported by logging companies.
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The difference between the normative and auctions approaches may
be due to the fact that in the normative approach a number of existing
taxes (e.g., road tax, taxes to non-budget funds, social and communal
taxes, police tax, etc.) were not accounted for, while the auction price
implicitly includes all costs. The high level of logging costs reported by
logging companies and local forest authorities relative to the estimation
results based on timber auctions data is due to the following reasons:
a) loggers, participating in timber auctions, are more efficient; b) auc-
tions reveal true costs; c) enterprises, when stating their costs, include
costs of road construction as current expenses, rather than as invest-
ments.
One of the possible explanations of the discrepancy between estimated
and market timber prices could be the existing market structure, i.e., a
certain degree of monopsony. For example, in the Novgorod Oblast
there are about 300 official logging companies, each of which produces,
on average, only about 7000 cubic meters of timber per year. It is quite
natural that the overwhelming majority of these loggers do not have mar-
keting services or any experience in such activities. At the same time, in
every region there are intermediary companies that are buying timber
from loggers at relatively low prices. According to the existing regula-
tions, intermediaries cannot take part in timber auctions. The only com-
Fig. 1. Coefficients C1 and C3 as functions of C4.
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petitors for these intermediaries are large companies that can afford
marketing services, e.g., "Novgorodlesprom."
In those regions where logging is done predominantly by leskhozy (e.g.,
Moscow region), intermediaries are especially active, since leskhozy,
being state regulating authorities, are not allowed to engage in commer-
cial activity.
In a number of cases, the activities of intermediaries are criminalized,
this being one of the main reasons for disbanding the former Federal
Forest Service in 2000.
To evaluate the effect of intermediaries on prices, a simple model of a
local monopsony is considered. There are a large number of competitive
loggers who sell timber to a limited number (equal to N) of intermediar-
ies at price p . These intermediaries, having market power only over lo-
cal loggers, sell timber on the open market for fixed price P . The vol-
ume of timber bought by a single intermediary equals iV . The total
volume of timber supplied by loggers is
1
N
i
i
V V
=
= ∑ .
Logging costs per cubic meter of timber equal c. In addition, loggers
pay a stumpage fee equal to Aτ . The inverse timber supply function is
given by
( )Ap c Vτ ϕ− − = ,     0ϕ′ > . (25)
Then the problem solved by intermediaries is as follows:
max[ ( )]
i
i
V
V P p− , (26)
where p  is defined by (25).
The solution of the problem (25)–(26) is as follows:
1
1 1
Ap N c
P N N P
η τ
η η
+
= +
+ +
, (27)
where ( ) 1/ /p V p Vη −= ∂ ∂  — price elasticity of timber supply.
It should be noted that the higher is stumpage fee, the higher is the ratio
p/P, and in the limiting case when A P cτ = − , (stumpage fee equals
timber rent), p = P, i.e., intermediaries get zero profit.
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Unfortunately, there are no reliable data on the number of timber inter-
mediaries and on the price elasticity of the timber supply. Still, under the
reasonable assumption that N = 3, 0.2η = , and using the actual data on
the timber market price, the logging cost and the stumpage fee
( 3150 /c RUB m≈ , 325 /A RUB mτ ≈ , 
3300 /P RUB m≈ ), it follows from
(27) that / 0.7p P ≈ , i.e., due to the imperfect market structure, the
price at which loggers sell their timber to intermediaries could be about
30% lower than the market price. Thus, a substantial share of timber
rent is likely to be captured by intermediaries.
7. TAX SHIFTING MODEL
Next, we turn to the problem of shifting the tax burden from labor and
capital to timber rent using the above results of timber rent estimation
with the aim to analyze the regional employment and welfare effects of a
marginal increase in stumpage fees, accompanied by a reduction in
payroll taxes, keeping constant the total amount of taxes collected. It is
assumed that the region's economy consists of two sectors — forestry
and the "rest-of-the-economy."
The problem is analyzed in the relatively short-term perspective, so that
the effects of shifting taxes on investment decisions are not considered.
It should be noted that, at present, in Russia it is extremely difficult to
quantitatively estimate the effect of changing the tax system on invest-
ment activity since the latter is defined not so much by economic as by
political factors. Besides, investments significantly depend on the inter-
est rate, which, as has already been mentioned above, is very high and
volatile in Russia at the present time.
Enterprises in the forest sector and the rest-of-the-economy are as-
sumed to function in competitive product and factor markets, so that
output and capital prices and wages are set exogenously. Besides, ex-
ogenous consumer wages can be explained within the efficiency-wage
framework (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The output of the forestry sector
is a function of labor and capital inputs FL  and FK , as well as of forest
area to be logged A, the timber quality and distance of the forest plot
from highways. It has been mentioned above that the main factor that
limits the exploitation of forests in Russia is distance. It is further as-
sumed that the density distribution function of the forest area relative to
distance — ( )f d , is known. The further the loggers move, the larger the
forest area that can be exploited.
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Moreover, it is assumed that within each distance class, the distribution
of forest area relative to quality is the same, so that the quality is taken
to be constant and equal to the average quality Q . Naturally, from (10),
if there are no taxes or stumpage fees, it follows that there is a critical
distance d∗ , defined by the zero rent condition
( ) ( ) ( ) 0F kP Q P k d wl d∗ ∗Ψ − − = , (28)
beyond which forests are not logged.
Then the total value of timber rent will be
0
( , ) ( )
d
R x Q f x dxρ
∗
= ∫ . (29)
Total labor employed in the forestry sector is
0
( , ) ( )
d
FL l x Q f x dx
∗
= ∫ , (30)
where l  is obtained from (9) under conditions that L DK=  and Q Q= ,
,d
DQ
l Ee E
B
µ
δ
= = . (31)
The output of the forest sector will be as follows:
0
( )
( )
d
F
Q
F f x dx
T
∗Ψ
= ∫ . (32)
The output in the rest-of-the-economy sector is a function of labor
ML and capital MK  according to production function
( , )M M MF L K , (33)
which is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in its production factors,
with capital MK  being fixed.
The total regional output is
F F M MY P F P F= + . (34)
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The government imposes taxes on labor and corporate profits, Lτ  and
Kτ  respectively, and collects stumpage fees at the level Aτ  per hectare
of timber stand. The government revenues are as follows:
( ) ( )L M F K M FG w L Lτ τ π= + + + Π + Ω , (35)
where
(1 )M M M M L MP F K wLπ ν τ= − − + , (36)
0
( ) ( )
d
F F x f x dxπ
∗
Π = ∫ , (37)
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )F F K L AP Q P k d wl d dπ ν τ τ= Ψ − − + − , (38)
0
( ) ( )
d
A x f x dxτ
∗
Ω = ∫ , (39)
where ν is a tax-deductible capital depreciation rate.
Stumpage fees are set exogenously as a function of distance and are
subject to the constraint
( ) ( )A d dτ ρ≤ . (40)
Employment in the rest-of-the-economy sector is defined by the profit
maximization condition, which yields
(1 )M M L
M
w
L L
P
τ
 
= +  
. (41)
Critical distance d∗  is the solution to the following zero-rent equation:
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0
1
K K
F L
K
P
P Q k d wl d
ντ
τ
τ
∗ ∗
−Ψ − − + =
−
. (42)
Stumpage fees, dependent on distance, should be set at a level that
does not exceed the timber rent, taking into account taxes on profit and
labor. Let θ be the share of stumpage fees in the after-tax timber rent.
Then,
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
1
K K
A F L
K
P
d P Q k d wl d
ντ
τ θ τ
τ
 −
= Ψ − − + 
− 
,    0 1θ≤ ≤ . (43)
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To estimate the marginal effects of shifting the tax burden from labor to
timber rent, under the constraint that total government revenues stay
constant, from equations (35)–(39) and (41)–(43), taking into account
0M K M F KdG dK d dw dP dP dPτ= = = = = = = , (44)
the function ( )Ld dτ θ  can be derived. To obtain this function, it is neces-
sary, first of all, to define density distribution function ( )f d . Taking into
account that the forests are cut within a certain strip along the roads, it
can be assumed that ( )f d f const= = . Then, from (30), (37), (39) it fol-
lows that
*( 1)dF
Ef
L eδ
δ
= − , (45)
(1 ) ( )
,1
(1 ) (1 ) ( 1)
(1 )
F
F dK K
L
K
P Q d
f P
w E e
D D
δ
θ
ν ντ θ τ θ
δ τ
∗
∗
 
− Ψ − 
Π =   −
− − + + − −  
−  
(46)
( ) (1 ) ( 1)
(1 )
dK K
F L
K
P E
f P Q d w e
D
δντθ τ
τ δ
∗
∗
  − Ω = Ψ − + + −  
−   
. (47)
From (28), (37) we have
( ) ( ) ( ) 0M F L L M F K M Fw L L d w dL dL d d dτ τ τ π+ + + + + Π + Ω = . (48)
Substituting into (48) the corresponding differentials obtained from (36),
(41), (45), (46), (47) and assuming that 1dδ ∗ << , the following equation
can be obtained:
1 (1 )
1
M L F
M K K K L
L M
L
wL Efwd d
L
ε τ
τ τ τ θ τ
τ
∗
   
− + − − + − +     +   
( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
K K
F L K
K
P
P Q w E fd d
D
ντ
τ τ θ
τ
∗
  − 
+ Ψ − + + − +  
−   
( ) (1 ) ( ) 0F K KP Q w E fd dd
ν
τ τ θ ∗
  
+ Ψ + − − + =        , (49)
where Mε  is the wage elasticity of labor demand in the rest-of-the-
economy sector.
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From (42) it follows that
( )
(1 )
(1 )
L
K K
L
K
w
d d d
P
w
D
τ
ντδ τ
τ
∗ = −  −
+ + 
− 
. (50)
After substituting (50) into (49), the function ( )Ld dτ θ  can be easily ob-
tained from the following equation:
1 [ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 )][ (1 )] (1 )
(1 )
(1 )
M L F
K K K
L M
LL K K K L
K K
L
K
L
a
L
c db
w Dw
P
d c
ε τ
τ τ τ θ
τ
ν ττ θ τ θ τ θ τ τ
τ νδ τ
ν τ∗
  
− + − − + − −  
+   
= − + + − − − − + 
−  −
+ +  
−   
1 (1 )
(1 )
K K
L K
K
P
b c d
τ ν
τ τ θ
ν τ
  −
= − − + + −  
−   , (51)
where
MLa
Efd∗
= ,    
( )FP Qb
Ew
Ψ
= ,    c
Dw
ν
= .
It is assumed that the economy is on the upward-sloping parts of the
Laffer curve for labor tax and stumpage fees, i.e.,
0
L
G
τ
∂
>
∂
, 0
G
θ
∂
>
∂
.
Under these conditions, it can be shown that the terms at Ldτ  and dθ  in
(51) are positive.
Then, from (51) it follows that under reasonable parameter values in-
creasing the share of timber rent appropriated by the state under con-
stant total budget revenues leads to decreasing payroll tax, which, in
turn, leads to higher employment in the rest-of-the-economy sector. Be-
sides, the critical distance of timber hauling increases, which leads to
higher employment and, consequently, output in the forest sector. The
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higher are the values of ( ) /FP Q AwΨ , Mε , θ  and the lower the value
/ML Afd∗ , the higher is the positive effect of increasing the share of tim-
ber rent appropriated by the state.
To estimate the effect of increasing the share of timber rent collected by
the state on the regional economy (Novgorod Oblast), the following pa-
rameter values have been used:
300000ML = , 15000FL = , 
3400 /FP RUB m= , 
3
( ) 200
m
Q
ha
Ψ = ,
0.22
persons
E
ha
= , 40000 / .w RUB cap yr= , 410fd ha∗ = ,
50.7 10
persons
D
RUB
−
= ⋅ , 
1
0.32KP yr
= ,
0.3Kτ = , 0.4Lτ = , 0.5θ = , 
1
0.2
yr
ν = .
The only parameter in (51) that is not easily observable is the wage elas-
ticity of labor demand Mε . One of the very few attempts to estimate Mε
for Russia has been undertaken by Konings and Lehmann (2000). The
estimated short-term wage elasticity of labor demand for Chuvashiya
(which could be considered as being similar to Novgorod Oblast) is
about 0.4–0.5. Taking into account that the above-presented economet-
ric estimates of the production function parameters refer to the case
when no new roads are being built, it is assumed that ( ) 0d d∗ = . Under
fixed d∗ , employment and output in forestry do not change. Then the
following dependencies can be obtained:
0.05Ld dτ θ= − ,
0.018M
M
dL
d
L
θ= ,
0.007M
M
dF
d
F
θ= .
Thus, in the relatively short-term perspective, doubling the share of tim-
ber rent appropriated by the state leads to increasing regional emplo-
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ment and output in the rest-of-the-economy sector by nearly 1% and
0.35%, respectively. It should be noted that these are relatively short-
term effects. In the long term perspective, the effects of tax shifting will
be more pronounced since long-term wage elasticity of labor demand is
several times higher than the short-term one. Thus, the society as a
whole gains from tax shifting. The only party that will lose from increas-
ing stumpage fees will be those within the forest sector who appropriate
a substantial share of timber rent and, as the actual state of affairs re-
veal, do not, as a rule, use these revenues for investment into forestry.
8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Even before the economic consequences of the tax shift are modelled,
one can ascertain the likelihood of the reform finding support among a
political constituency. At least 10 different types of stakeholders can be
distinguished, including the three levels of government (federal, regional
and local), the three branches of authority of the Forest Service, the
three main groups of protagonists in the forest industry  (loggers, proc-
essors and vertically integrated companies), and traders. All
stakeholders are interested in forest rents, though for different reasons.
For simplicity purposes, we assume that increases in rental payments
would materialize through increases in stumpage fees.
Table 18 attempts to summarize the expected reactions to the proposed
tax shift, deconstructing the response for each measure that makes up
the policy package. Each measure (A through I) is scored based upon
the response expected from each stakeholder. Each measure receives a
score between 1 (well received) and –1 (rejected). The scores are then
totaled per stakeholder. A total score of +9 suggests that the
stakeholder accepts all measures; –9 means the stakeholder is opposed
to all measures. The measures are used in the following ways:
(A) to better define forest costs, i.e., to know more accurately how much
it costs to produce timber depending on local conditions. Once costs are
known with greater certainty, stumpage rates can also be set more pre-
cisely;
(B) to develop better knowledge of forests implies better inventories of
timber and non-timber resources so that sellers and buyers ascertain
more accurately the value of the standing plot to be logged;
(C) to improve the use of forests means, inter alia, putting up for
sale the most appropriate timber plots, encouraging more rational log-
ging, etc.;
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Table 18. Predicted Initial Responses to Tax Shift.
Forest Service Administration Forest industry
Measure proposed
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*
1
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A Better definition
of forest costs + + + + + + – – – ?
B Better knowledge of
forests + + + + + + ? ? ? ?
C Better use of forests + + + + + + ? ? ? ?
D More transparent
forest auctions + ? ? + ? ? ? ? ? ?
E Regulation of timber
oligopsony + ? ? + ? ? + ? – –
F Limit leskhozy to
management + ? – + ? ? + + + ?
G Differentiate
stumpage fees + + + + ? ? – – – –
H Forest revenue
recycling – – – ? + + + + + +
I Earmark for forest
management + + + – – – + – – –
Total score 7 4 3 6 3 3 2 –1 –2 –2
* VIC means vertically integrated company.
Legend: "+" means favorable and equals +1; "–" means unfavorable and equals –1;
"?" means difficult to predict and equals 0.
(D) making forest auctions more transparent means making them more
competitive so that the rent is more properly revealed and captured;
(E) regulating the timber oligopsony means curbing the market power
possibly exercised by wood processors and intermediaries in the forestry
business. The objective is to ensure greater competition and openness in
market relations;
(F) leskhozy need to limit their activities to their core function of forest
management and refrain from carrying out commercial activities;
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(G) stumpage fees need to be differentiated to better reflect site-specific
rent-generating conditions;
(H) recycling means that the revenues of higher stumpage fees will be
used to reduce taxes on capital and labor;
(I) revenues could be earmarked, i.e., reserved for investments and ex-
penditures on forest management and environmental protection.
(1) The Federal Forest Service (FFS)3 favors all measures fostering bet-
ter forest management. It would oppose the use of forest revenues for
other purposes than forestry. The earmarking proposal would certainly
be well received.
(2) The regional branch of the Forest Service (RFS) should look favorably
at improved forest management. Its position is less clear regarding the
regulation of wood markets, as it may have a vested interest in non-
transparency and market distortions. The RFS may be divided on forest
revenue recycling.
(3) For reasons similar to those invoked for the RFS, the reaction of the
leskhozy is expected to be positive on the aspects of forest manage-
ment, but less predictable with respect to market regulation. Their reac-
tion should be negative to the question whether to confine leskhozy to
their legally defined function of forest management. Of all actors,
leskhozy should be the most favorable towards increases in stumpage
fees, since the 1997 Forest Code mandates that all revenues above
minimal stumpage rates be directed to leskhozy. They are expected to
oppose the recycling of those additional forest revenues.
(4) The federal administration should look favorably upon all the meas-
ures proposed, with the possible exception of revenue recycling and the
exception of earmarking revenues for forest management. The Ministry
of Finance, for example, might think it wiser to let the additional forest
revenue swell the federal coffers.
(5) Similarly to the RFS, the regional administration will likely react posi-
tively to the proposed improvements in forest management. It would be
equally ambivalent regarding the proposed market regulation. In contrast
to the RFS and the federal administration, the regional administration
would be divided on the issue of a raise in stumpage fees. Since in-
creased stumpage fees mean additional revenues and also possibly a
more efficient timber market, the regional administration should favor in-
creases in stumpage fees. However, it is also concerned about develo-
                                               
3 The FFS has been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Natural Re-
sources since May 2000.
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ing the regional forestry sector by attracting new investors. The regional
administration should support forest revenue recycling to cutting taxes
on capital and labor.
(6) The local administration would react as the regional administration.
(7) Logging firms would not welcome the tightening in forestry cost ac-
counting if these rules hurt their profitability. They should be indifferent
to improvements in forest management, favorable to measures designed
to curb oligopsonistic power in the timber market, hostile to increases in
stumpage fees, favorable to forest revenue recycling (especially if recy-
cling helps reduce their tax burden), and favorable to earmarking as this
helps ensure long-term supplies of raw materials.
(8) Wood processors would react in a way similar to loggers, except on
the question of oligopsony regulation, as some processing firms benefit
from oligopsony.
(9) Vertically integrated companies (VIC) combine the functions of log-
ging, processing and sometimes also trading. They will respond posi-
tively to the confinement of leskhozy in forest management and to forest
revenue recycling but negatively to proposals hurting their profitability.
(10) Wood traders should generally be hostile to the measured designed
to capture some of the rent currently appropriated by traders. They
would welcome revenue recycling. They should be indifferent to changes
in cost accounting rules, though this could ultimately have an effect on
market prices as well.
9. CONCLUSIONS
There are relatively few estimates of timber rent in Russia, and these are
not based on econometric estimations; they are contradictory and ex-
tremely unreliable.
Timber rent revenues appropriated by the forest-rich regions of Russia
are very low due to unjustifiably low stumpage fees. For example, in the
relatively forest-rich Novgorod Oblast, stumpage fees in 1999 accounted
for only 1.3% of consolidated regional budget revenues.
Widely used in the West, the netting-out approach to timber rent estima-
tion is hardly applicable in Russia due to the very low quality of data re-
ported by logging companies.
Estimations of timber rent based on normative and timber auction data
produce statistically reliable results.
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Logging costs obtained from timber rent estimations are significantly
lower than those reported by loggers.
The low values of timber rent appropriated by loggers and the state
could be explained by the local monopsony, i.e., by the presence of a
limited number of intermediaries between loggers and the market who
capture a considerable share of the timber rent.
Shifting the tax burden from labor to timber rent is economically effi-
cient. Doubling the share of timber rent appropriated by the state in
Novgorod Oblast could lead to increasing employment by nearly 1% and
regional output by about 0.35%.
Increasing stumpage fees, accompanied by tax shifting, should be sup-
ported by federal, regional and local Forest Services and Administra-
tions, though opposed by forest industry.
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